

FORDHAM CENTER ON RELIGION AND CULTURE

Fordham University

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THE ETHICS OF EXIT:
THE MORALITY OF WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ

Monday, March 21, 2005
Fordham University, New York NY

PANEL 2: LEARNING FROM THE PAST

MODERATOR: FRANCES FITZGERALD,
Journalist

SPEAKER: STANLEY HOFFMANN,
PAUL AND CATHERINE BUTTENWEISER UNIVERSITY, PROFESSOR,
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

FRANCES FITZGERALD: It is a great honor and a pleasure to introduce Stanley Hoffman. I first met him when I was an undergraduate at Harvard. I remember his lectures well. They were so dazzling; they took our collective breath away. I've always thought of him as everything an intellectual ought to be, including a great wit and a charmer. Stanley is the Paul and Catherine Buttenweiser University Professor at Harvard. He was the chairman of Harvard Center for European Studies for 25 years and he has taught French intellectual and political history, postwar European history, American foreign policy, modern political ideologies, and many other subjects.

He also is the author of more books than I have time to list, but here

is the title of
one of them that he wrote in 1978 ñ 78 mind you ñ and itís called
ìPrimacy or
World Order: American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War.î Stanley is
always a
decade or two ahead of us. (Laughter.) His more recent works include
ìThe
European Sisyphus: Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention
and World
Disorders of 1998.î He has just finished a book on Iraq called
ìGulliver
Unbound.î

STANLEY HOFFMANN: Itís out.

MS. FITZGERALD: Weíve got all go and buy it. So, Stanley, please tell
us how to
think about this fraught subject, the ethics of withdrawal. And I am
also
supposed to tell you that there will be people passing around slips
for questions
and you will see them later on. (Applause.)

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MR. HOFFMANN: Itís a great pleasure to be introduced by Frankie (sp)
FitzGerald. I have been a great admirer of her for many, many years
starting with
her wonderful Fire in the Lake. Of course, that doesnít make us any
younger, but
since I am supposed to talk at least in part about the pastóthe
lessons of the
pastóI am very, very happy to find her here.

We have to remember in our discussions that ethics and politics are
inseparable.
If you are at all concerned with ethics, and I think we all are, we

have to realize that in political affairs ethics can become relevant only if one starts with a reasonably correct analysis of the political situation. Conversely, one must also remember that political decisions are, whether you like it or not, moral decisions.

I was teaching in the past term a course with my former student and great friend Reverend Bryan Hehir on the ethics of the use of force. He is now part-time at the Kennedy School and part-time trying to rescue the diocese of Boston; the latter being much more difficult. We had a very interesting composite group of students and he wanted the class to discuss the responsibilities of leaders in a war. To whom does a political or military leader owe his highest or her highest allegiance? We had one student who told us in no uncertain terms that once a war begins there are no more moral questions: it's all pragmatic. Surprise.

Let me begin with some remarks about what lessons there are and then I will abbreviate the second part, which is about where to go from here. As I just told George Lopez, he has made my speech for me, so all I can do is repeat it and I will be brief on that. My first remark about the lessons that the situation in Iraq is in fact relatively unique. First, it's not really comparable to the exiting of colonial powers after long periods of imperial rule. If one examines the effects of the exit of colonial powers—France, Holland, Belgium and of course Great Britain—one finds that the consequences were all over the place. In the case of Ireland and India you had extremely bloody partitions. In the case of Algeria, there was the takeover and a very rapid falling apart of the Algerian National Liberation Front, but also, as was mentioned, the extermination of the Algerian Harki, who had fought on the French side.

In the case of the Middle East after decolonization, the priority and

imperative
became fighting against our recreation of Israel. In the case of the takeover of Indochina, first the French part in the north I mean first French north and then Vietnam you had a combination of communist rule and revenge against those who had collaborated with the French and later with the Americans. In many of the countries where the colonial powers were replaced by local anti-imperialist or nationalist forces, you had rule and often misrule by those forces. If you look at Indonesia, if you look at Ghana, if you look at Nigeria very often this did lead to ethnic wars, so it is a very mixed bag. And even when the consequences were

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disastrous the consequences of the exit of the colonial powers as they have been in the Congo, for the colonial powers to have stayed in order to prevent instability or chaos certainly was not an alternative and couldn't have been an alternative.

One comparison which has been made quite often is with the countries that were defeated during World War II and occupied by the Allies, and other countries of Eastern Europe, which were occupied by the Soviets for a very long time - almost half a century. This, too, is not comparable with what is going on in Iraq.

In Japan there was no insurgency, there was minimal hostility in the population, there was a phenomenal recovery. In both Japan and in Germany, Allied

military forces became not so much occupiers as the protectors against the Soviet threat. In the case of Eastern Europe you had a rare combination, and in fact quite exceptional, of respectable nationalist forces like Solidarity in Poland, international agreements settling the future (for instance in the case of East Germany) plus the attraction of the European Community in those countries once they were liberated. None of these you find in the Iraqi case.

What is it that is not unique in the case of Iraq? In the first place it is the mental conditions of American entry into this affair. That was certainly not unique. It was this combination of an extraordinarily flattering self-image. I am a European and I will never stop being astonished by the American capacity for having the highest self-flattering self image of any nation that I know. (Laughter.) We can only do good. As James Reston once said in distant days of the Vietnam War after the Christmas bombing of Hanoi in '72, our methods are terrible, but our hearts are pure and it is the purity of the hearts that counts. We can only do good. All of the rest is collateral damage or the fact of a few stray, bad people, who will of course be punished, not their superiors.

So there is the self-image. There is the ignorance of what in my book, written in the mid-1960s called *Gulliver's Troubles*, I called not understanding the foreignness of foreigners: getting into countries whose languages one doesn't know, whose culture one doesn't know, whose history one doesn't know. (In the middle of a debate on reforming the curriculum, there is some move afoot for asking our undergraduates to learn foreign languages. But there are some forces, which will be nameless, that think that with English and mathematics any American can do anything anywhere in the world. That is a quote, I won't tell you from whom. [Laughter.] It is enough if our students know that foreign

languages
exist. [Laughter.] At a time when one also wants to send every
undergraduate
abroad for a few months this strikes me as very risky.) But anyway, so
there is
this little problem.

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Then thereís this extraordinary combination of destructive power, the
kind that
precisely Reston was talking about, firepower and utopia. It makes for
a very,
very strange mix. Everything today is going to be blood and more
blood, but
tomorrow nirvana will commence. There is the belief that only we can
bring
utopia.

I must express my only criticism of the discussion we just had, which
is that this
is all about us, idealized, and the Iraqis. The rest of the world is
as if it didnít
exist or could exist only if it comes and takes a place on our terms.
That ainít the
way the world looks from outside the United States.

The other thing which is not unique is this extraordinary mixture
which we saw
in Vietnam, and which we also had seen earlier in the immediate
postwar China
policy of the United States before the communists took over. There is
the mixture
of highly mixed ends, as weíve had in the case of Iraq; inappropriate
means, as we
do have in Iraq; and a huge amount of wishful thinking about what the
natives
wanted and thought. So this is not new, but itís depressing that óor
should I say
it is depressing that at the end of my life óI should find a situation

pretty much exactly, alas, as I have described it in the mid 1960s, which only shows that history is not the history of ever-rising progress.

There is a quote, which I would have read to you if I had had the time and hadn't left it on my chair, from the French writer Roman Roland in 1926 describing the American mix of innocence and naiveté and the conviction of always being absolutely right and always acting in the interest of all of mankind and being really quite shocked when some people don't agree. So take my word, it was already there in 1926.

Finally, there are some lessons that we can derive from the very recent past, in other words, from the whole Iraqi expedition itself. First of all, and this has been alluded to by our panelists, in fact very well, the extraordinary mismanagement of the occupation, the fact that there was only minimal planning. Despite attempts by the State Department to gain some entry into the Pentagon's thinking, there have been all the mistakes that have been made after the end of Saddam's rule. On this score, I have tried to deal with those political zigzags before Bremer, during Bremer, since Bremer in the book that Franky just mentioned, "Gulliver Unbound."

In fact, what has worked in Iraq, as many commentators have pointed out in recent books, has not been the American policy; it was Ayatollah Sistani's policy, including the idea of these elections. There is another lesson from the past, unlike what we did in Europe after World War II, we have botched the reconstruction of Iraq and that's an important chapter: calling on American

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contractors with very limited knowledge of the country instead of trying to provide work to the Iraqis themselves, which has created a great deal of resentment.

Militarily, we pushed ourselves into a trap of which Fallujah was the best example. Either in order not to add to the casualties of the whole Iraqis, at first we wouldn't do anything. And then when we saw that this had very great risks, we went in not very gently and expelled and killed large numbers of people and extremely; it seems to me, a very costly trap indeed.

Diplomatically, we have had to pay over the last couple of years a very heavy price for the unilateralism with which we went into Iraq. In full innocence and with the same good conscience as ever, we are very disappointed when our allies don't feel terribly enthusiastic about becoming essentially the servants of our American designs in Iraq. But, frankly, why should the French or the Germans pay for mistakes they had denounced in the first place? And in the cases like Italy or Great Britain, where we have found coalition partners, that unpopularity of the war has been extreme.

So it is not clear yet, despite Dr. Rice's recent trip to Europe, whether this lesson has been learned: that unilateralism or asking others to work on one's terms is not the best way of getting the support one needs from others. This is what the past suggests to me. Now let me make some remarks about where I think we should go, and here I am trying to combine ethical imperatives and political normative vision if you like.

The first point I would make and it is a point which has been extremely well made by a writer and former member of the American team in Iraq for whom I have enormous amount of intellectual admiration and respect even though I disagree with him about what to do next that is Noah Feldman in his book, What We Owe Iraq. He points out in a recent paper, which is superb, that the best thing we could do is to stay out of Iraqi domestic affairs; that the temptation of helping them with the constitution, of telling them what a liberal democracy should be, is one that ought to be resisted. It seems to me that after we have finished congratulating ourselves on these elections, we are still faced with four problems which are formidable, and I am not sure that we are terribly well equipped to deal with any of them.

One is the problem of the Sunnis, to which I will come back and about which much has been said already. The second is the problem of the Kurds who are demanding a big pound of flesh, so to speak, and whose population basically would favor independence if it was politically and diplomatically feasible; that hasn't been resolved by the formation of the government yet. The third problem

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is that of the role of religion in the future constitution. And fourth, which nobody has mentioned, but which I find very ominous and that is the following: the way

the brave Iraqis voted was, I would say, a blind vote. They had to choose among an enormous number of lists whose members they knew very little about; very often the names have been kept secret for security purposes.

And even if they had known the names, the fact is that many of the people who were on those lists and who got elected were exiles. Now, they are perfectly honorable people, but many of them have been away from Iraq for 25 or 30 years. They owe their return to the American army, so of course they not going to ask for our exit unless they are absolutely sure that the wind isn't going to turn, but how long will those Iraqis who have lived in Iraq for that period want to vote for people who have not shared that period?

I remember what happened in many European countries after World War II, which only lasted a few years: the people who came back from exile did not fair very well in the long run in politics. When we hear, as we heard this morning, that none of the current Iraqi leaders really wants the U.S. to depart, we have to remember that it's not exactly in their interest at this point to ask us to depart.

Next problemsóset of imperatives: the security choices about which we have heard a great deal this morning. What are the arguments for staying until they (are sorted out). The argument is made very powerfully by Noah Feldman in his book, we are like people who while driving our car knocked down the very person whom we wanted to help; therefore we owe these people recovery and surgery. When he mentioned this in a group at Harvard, one of the listeners said that if she had had her knee crushed by an automobile, she would not ask the driver to perform the surgeryó(laughter)óshe would go to the best possible surgeon. At that point even Noah Feldman, who is about the nimblest mind I have come across in a long time, didn't quite know what to answer. (Laughter.)

But there is this problem: what we owe. The question of what we owe, which is of course a very serious one, is not so simple. If staying the course actually prolongs the insurrection and facilitates the entry of terrorists, is staying such a good idea? If there is no security, however hard it is being fought on the battlefield, without political and economic measures, why don't we concentrate on those? How can we, as Feldman and others propose, maintain a large contingent of American forces in order to try to ensure security without interfering with the daily work, the daily autonomy, and the legitimacy of the Iraqi government. So this is one problem which the defenders of staying the course should consider. The other reason is, as has been mentioned, the need to avoid an increasingly broad civil war and the breakup of the country. Again, this assumes that without dealing with the domestic politics of Iraq, we can prevent this sort of a breakup. Breakup

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can be due not only to the insurrection, but also to the fact that the insurrection is, as has been mentioned, a composite that no solid attempts have been made to disaggregate or disentangle those various elements. Simply fighting them facilitates an amalgamation which is not particularly homogenous. That brings ones back to the political problems and away from the purely military ones.

The arguments against staying are we've heard them and I can only repeat what

Mr. Lopez in particular has said. I don't think there is a military solution to the insurrection. There rarely is. There have been a few cases—Malaysia which was a rather special case, but usually there is no purely military solution for the defeat of an insurrection. I very well remember the French in Algeria and in Indochina.

I think the presence of the United States, which is justified by the need to increase stability, is in fact what contributes to instability even if the attacks now go primarily against Iraqi forces. And, by the way, I forget to mention this when I was thinking about the lessons of the recent past. I am very uncomfortable when I read those articles like Mr. Burns' in today's Times. I read it all in the case of Vietnam: there was this light at the end of the tunnel; just before the Tet offensive there were all those statistics showing that the insurgency had decreased. It sure did, because they were preparing the Tet offensive. There were kilometers of statistics that Mr. McNamara in those days lived on, showing that everything is better. So before we self-congratulate ourselves on a certain decline in the number of direct attacks on the Americans, I am afraid that I suspend judgment until further notice.

The best policy that I could recommend is certainly not abandoning Iraq; the choice is not between staying and abandoning. It is finding ways of staying that are ethical and helpful and not self-interested. Mr. Lopez has spoken very well about this. It is in that respect trying to get the Iraqi government, future government, to negotiate with those elements in the insurrection that feel that they have been left out; negotiate not only in order to give them a sort of amnesty, but also in order to give people who have been used to ruling this country, for better and worse, some of the same concessions — is that the word? — that the Kurds have obtained. Why shouldn't they?

If this is done seriously, it might complicate the domination of the Shiites, but such is life. If you have to recognize many of the demands of the Kurds in order to have a unified country, you may want to assure the Sunnis that they are not going to move suddenly from often outrageous domination to subservience. This is a political task. And the other task, which is, it seems to me, both essential and ethical is to provide finally for a reconstruction of the country by entrusting it very largely to the Iraqis, in such a way that it empowers the Iraqis to run their own economy. This is exactly what we were so good at doing immediately after

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the Second World War, at a time when we had not yet decided that we were really not very good at, and not very favorable to, nation-building.

I agree that a withdrawal is not likely to be accompanied by the presence of other forces, although we are going to hear from my friend Professor Hashmi this afternoon that even that idea is not totally absurd. What I do think is that the training of Iraqi security forces ought to be a UN activity or at least under the UN umbrella and that could be done with the participation of our regular allies. What I do believe also is that we should be very careful not to use the Kurds, who owe a great deal to us indeed, as a way of controlling Iraq in the future. In that respect what was said this morning about permanent bases is right. I am not talking

about bases while our troops are still there. And also I would say about the contracts that have been signed about oil production is something we should get out of if only in order to try to disarm the hostility of other Arab countries. Also it seems to me this would of course be very difficult for this administration to swallow we ought to come out for an international inspection of the fate of war prisoners. There is no more disturbing chapter, to use an understatement, than what we now gradually learn dribble by dribble about the conditions not only in Abu Ghraib, but in other prisons in that part of the world. So that, it seems to me, is something which would not mean abandoning Iraq, but would mean a fairly drastic shift in priorities. I repeat, the choice is not between staying for an indeterminate future and abandoning a country toward which we have many duties.

There is another imperative beyond the security problem; it is the state-building imperative. When I look at the future of international relations, I see the task of state-building as an increasingly enormous one. At least half of the states in this world are disintegrating or murderous or troubled. As long as it is only four or five, like the rhinoceroses in Ionesco's play, it is fine. But once most states turn into rhinoceroses, we have a problem on our hands. And if we continue to say that we don't do this we don't do that, as some of the American military personnel have told us, the American Army is not made for that; as one of them put it rather unforgettably, our role is to kill. I said, well, we tried to suggest that some other armies in the world do not find it degrading to help take children to school, for instance in Kosovo. The answer was, well, if the Europeans want to do that, let them do that, or the Indians, but we are the American Army. Just as General Powell used to say in an argument against intervention in Yugoslavia: we

don't do mountains. We do deserts, but we don't do mountains.

Well, the American Army should learn to do nation-state building. I am not talking about nation-building. A nation, a state, the institutions of a state's effective institutions cannot be built from the outside. This is a task in which we, our allies, the other democracies in the world, which are not limited to the

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members of NATO, can play a very important role. It's multinational by definition. Our concentration in the case of Iraq should be particularly on a judicial system, on developing Iraqi capacities for self-government.

Finally, there are diplomatic imperatives, which might help most perhaps in the long run with the insurrection and certainly with the Arab world, with which we have a serious problem. One is, of course, trying to help resolve the Palestinian issue instead of always saying that we are going to be very active and then falling asleep on the job. And in the case of Iran, prudence. And at this moment, it doesn't look too hopeless.

As for the great dream of democratization, I think we should certainly not keep embracing dictatorial regimes because in the long run this is not going to make us very popular and that's only going to encourage some of the worst aspects of many of those regimes. But to press for immediate democratization when one doesn't know what comes after is a little bit like, on a smaller scale, the invasion of Iraq. A French sociologist of great renown in the 19th century says

that you
can destroy only what you can replace. It was Auguste Comte. We don't
really
know what we would replace some of those regimes with, so that if
there is to be
pressure, it should not come from us alone; it should be very gradual
and it
should be prudent, but this not an administration that has shown a
great deal of
prudence. Here, too, one needs an international approach and not a
purely
American one.

So this has been too long as usual, but it's a big topic and it's a
great occasion.
Thank you. (Applause.) \

MS. FITZGERALD: I thought just to add a word or two to this analysis.
But, first
to say with Stanley that it is enormously discouraging to me to find
both that 25
years after we pulled out of occupying another unruly Third World
country that
we went in and did the same thing all over again. Possibly it was some
kind of
reaction to our defeat in Vietnam. Possibly it was a sense that since
the Cold War
ended, we no longer had our previous constraints on the use of
military power
and therefore it was going to be fine this time. But certainly, I
think what the
invasion and the occupation rest on is an extremely simple-minded view
about
power.

Joseph Wilson whose name may be familiar to probably his wife's name
is more
familiar now, Ms. Valerie Plame said in my hearing that at the
beginning he
thought the administration was divided between pith helmets and whack-
amoles.
And he had finally decided there were very few pith helmets in the
group
and that essentially the strategy was whack-a-mole; that is to say,
you've seen the
Japanese game in which the little moles come out of holes and you
whack them

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and then they come out of another one and you whack them down again.
It was,
you know, if you can get rid of Saddam Hussein everything is going to
be fine. I
worry about this in terms of Iran and North Korea as wellóthat somehow
the use
of force is going to solve all of your problems.

To the contrary it seems to me, both in the case of Vietnam and in the
case of
Iraq, the only key thing really has to do with local politics. You
know, all of us
watching television become totally preoccupied by whatís happening to
American
troops, and understandably. We care what happens to them, and we care
a lot.
But theyíre in the way almost irrelevant to what actually occurs in
Iraq. What is
important is whether the Iraqis can create a government that will be
seen as
legitimate by the great majority of the population. That means that
the
politicians have to make a deal. The deal should have been made before
the
election, but we were certainly not in a mood to do it at the time or
help it along.
It now has to be done afterwards in order to include, as many have
said, those
Sunni elements that are willing to concede that they will not
monopolize power
forever and that are willing to give up something for a stable Iraq.

The politics are incredibly complicated, not just because of the
ethnic and
political divisions, and religious divisions, but rather because in
the absence of
the Baíath Party, which was everywhere, you know, with cells down to
the local
level, a lot of people are simply not organized into any particular
political groupó

any effective force, so building those local political structures is a part of the deal. It's extremely hard for politicians sitting on top to make deals with each other when they are not sure whether they will get the support from below. But to me, that is the main issue and I am not sure that the U.S. can help this along very much. I don't think we have very much talent for it, but beyond that it will look as though it's our doing and therefore be counterproductive. I think what we can do is first of all make it clear that we are not there forever, that we will get out as soon as the sovereign government wants, and that we have no designs on Iraqi oil or military bases and so on.

We can also start dealing with Iraq's neighbors. I think you will hear the real issue is Iran because if the insurgency grows and develops and the Shi'as feel themselves in a bad spot, Iran cannot help but come into this. So in order to lay the basis for some regional stability, we have to start engaging with Iran.

I think there are some questions coming and we have about eight minutes.

Questions & Answers

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MS. FITZGERALD: Can a stable government be created without granting a disproportionate share of power, influence, and wealth to the Sunni minority, and are there Sunni groups we can make a deal with? Are we negotiating with them now?

Well, Stanley, is that the issue? The issue is not we negotiating with the Sunnis, it is that of the Shi'ia and the Kurds negotiating with the Sunnis and that's the only way it's going to work.

Do you want to say something about this?

MR. HOFFMANN: Yeah, I just want to read a few lines from an article written by the historian Harris Potter (ph), who has also written about Vietnam. He is calling for a negotiation with the insurrection and he expects, given the decentralized nature of the insurgency, that some leaders would undoubtedly refuse to participate in an agreement at first. However, if the agreement called for a phased series of mutual ceasefire agreements starting in cities in the Sunni triangle followed quickly by almost simultaneous insurgent demobilization and

U.S. withdrawal, the successful implementation of the first U.S. withdrawal could certainly bring about a dramatic change in a political climate in Sunni areas. Especially if those who surrendered were honored locally for their role in achieving that withdrawal, the pressures on initial holdouts to participate in the process could quickly become irresistible except for the small hard corps of Saddamists whose participation in Saddam's crimes would make them ineligible for amnesty. The hundreds of foreign terrorists in Iraq would not profit from such a settlement, but the dynamic could easily change if a peace agreement were negotiated ending the U.S. and coalition occupation. I think this is very important because it means that as for many insurrections in recent and past history, it's a political solution that one ought to go for because if the military won it, with all the ups and downs of that, we would be stuck there forever. So it's neither in our interest, nor ultimately that of the Iraqis. As for concessions, well, there obviously ought to be, in the first

place, all the guarantees that the many treaties since World War I have granted to minorities, but I think there ought to be a recognition that on some crucial measures, and in fact the Kurds have practically obtained this, decisions have to be taken with the consent of the representatives at least of the three major communities: the Kurds, the Shiites and the Sunnis. That would not prevent the Shiites in elections, where they are a majority, of obtaining a majority, it would simply mean that as in many other countries the majority cannot do absolutely everything it likes just because it is a majority. This, I think, was known in the jargon of political science before it became a branch of mathematics, (laughter) as checks and balances and especially and not only in the Middle East. In countries which have very diverse

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communities and in which every community wants to have a way of not being overwhelmed by others and of influencing decisions, this I am afraid is going to be the wave of the future in Europe as well as in the Middle East and we might as well accept this as a fact of life.

MS. FITZGERALD: I think we only have time for one more question, and it is very hard to choose from among them. I am sorry, but perhaps we'll get to some later. Here's one. How about declaring a U.S. victory, getting an Iraqi government to order us to leave, and then leaving? (Laughter.) Wouldn't that's

strengthen an Iraqi government by giving it a nationalist image?

MR. HOFFMANN: Well, that's a great idea. The problem, as we heard earlier, is that the people who are going to form that government, who were indeed elected by voters who had to choose among so many lists, is that it's not always clear that they knew exactly what they were doing, and have no interest in asking us to leave. That's the point I tried to raise about the discrepancy between, let's put it bluntly, our protest and that's not a contemptuous word; these are very brave people who left Iraq because of Saddam's dictatorship. Some of them are not just brave, but very admirable. But their interests and those of the Iraqi people will not necessarily be the same. They owe us a great deal to the leaders. The Iraqi people the least one can say is that they must have very mixed feelings, and as somebody said already, it's no fun being occupied. For many of the exiles this was a liberation and a mistake made by the administration was to extend this to the views of all Iraqis, so they expected flowers and songs. Well, that's not what has happened. So we have a little problem there.

MS. FITZGERALD: Are you saying that staying makes the creation of a legitimate nationalist government staying with American troops more difficult than if we leave at this point?

MR. HOFFMANN: Well, I didn't go into this because it had been dealt with very well by Professor Lopez. I think the notion of phased withdrawals and while that process goes on putting American troops in their bases would already be a beginning. But as long as we are the ones who really fight the insurrection, and especially if the insurrections should grow which is not impossible despite the daily news in the last two weeks we may be in very, very serious trouble. I do not see how a government, even a government of friends can have full autonomy and can pass as a legitimate Iraqi government when security, which is

after all
one of the, not the only one, but one of the essential functions that
it has to look
after, is in the hands of the occupier.

MS. FITZGERALD: Well, Iím afraid on that note we are going to have to
stop.
But we will get to some more of these questions later on.

FORDHAM CENTER ON RELIGION AND CULTURE
Fordham University
113 West 60th Street, Room 224 LLC
New York, NY 10023-7484
Ph: 212.636.6927 www.fordham.edu/ReligCulture
Thank you.
(Applause.)